John Howard's Covert East Timor independence plan

John Howard's covert East Timor independence plan

September 05, 2009
Article from: The Australian

THE Howard government decided in early 1999 to work for East Timor's independence but concealed this from the Indonesian government, John Howard and Alexander Downer have revealed.

And senior Australian and US officials have disclosed that the Clinton administration threatened Jakarta with US military retaliation if Indonesian forces contested the Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor.

These revelations in the book The March of Patriots - the Struggle for Modern Australia contradict the decade-long orthodoxy about the 1999 East Timor crisis.

Interviewed for the book, the former prime minister revealed he believed it was "inevitable" the East Timorese would vote for independence, but Australia could never admit nor concede this "because we had to work with the Indonesians" .

The former foreign minister, who spearheaded this strategy, told the author off the record at Davos in late January 1999 at the start of the process: "I think there is now a very good chance East Timor will be independent by the end of this year, and we intend to go along with this."

However, this Howard-Downer stance was not widely recognised within the Australian government. The Defence Department was not privy to such views and acted on the official policy: that East Timor should remain within Indonesia.

The Howard-Downer strategy culminated in a determination to proceed with the August 1999 independence ballot despite growing violence.

Mr Downer said: "If you kept putting it (the ballot) off because of the level of violence, well, on that basis, it would never happen. The critics will say I was wrong, but I was absolutely determined the ballot was going to take place. I spoke to (East Timor's Jose) Ramos Horta about it when the violence was growing and growing. I told him that if you don't take this ballot now it may not come again for another 10 or 20 years. And he said, 'We need the ballot now'."

While Mr Howard and Mr Downer publicly said they preferred East Timor to stay within Indonesia, their actions were geared to creating a new nation.

Interviewed for the book, Mr Howard said he "accepted that (independence) would happen". But, as prime minister, "one had to be careful about handling that publicly" and the task was to reconcile Jakarta to this.

"You had to get the Indonesians to agree," Mr Howard said.

He said the reason he refused to insist on a peacekeeping force before the ballot was because that "would have meant no ballot" and no transition to independence.

Before the Australia-led UN force under Major General Peter Cosgrove landed in East Timor, US defence secretary William Cohen visited Jakarta and delivered a lethal warning.

Former foreign affairs chief Ashton Calvert said: "The message Cohen conveyed was, 'If you touch the Australians, the United States will come after you'."

A Pentagon official travelling with Mr Cohen, James Schear, said: "The Pentagon's top leadership was of the view that if Australian forces got into serious difficulties, then the US, as an ally, would unquestionably act to assist them."

Mr Cohen's message to Indonesia's president Habibie and defence minister General Wiranto was that "this deployment must not be contested".

The truth, however, is that American engagement came very late and only after the independence vote.

Former US assistant secretary of state Stan Roth said Mr Howard's post-ballot pressure on the US was critical in getting the Clinton administration to re-assess.

"My personal belief is that thousands of East Timorese are alive today because of John Howard," Mr Roth said.

When the UN force did arrive, post-ballot there were an estimated 30,000 Indonesian and pro-Indonesian forces in East and West Timor.

The then chief of the Defence Force, Chris Barrie, said: "We were very lucky.

"Had a firefight started, I think the outcome could have been different."

http://www.theaustr alian.news. com.au/st ... 77,00.html